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INTRODUCTION
In a deeply interesting and provocative Article in these pages,'
Professor Drucilla Cornell attempts to bring together two strands of
her own experience, one as a former labor organizer, the other as He-
gelian scholar. But reconciliation does not prove easy. Initially, Pro-
fessor Cornell makes an important observation about the nature of the
employment relationship that deserves more attention from the legal
community. Based on an elaborately reconstructed rendition of He-
gelian thought, Professor Cornell moves from the observation that
one's job is immensely important to one's sense of well-being and
identity, to the rather strange policy implication that statutes should
be passed that forbid employers to fire employees without "just
cause." The statutory regime she advocates is extremely modest. It
would not really change the common law rule of employment at will
except to the extent that employers would be required to explain to
workers their reasons for firing them.2
Cornell defends her proposal on the grounds that it would save a
fired worker's sense of personhood, and prevent his "systematic ex-
ploitation." While Cornell is undoubtedly correct that there are
workers who will feel depersonalized and alienated if they are not told
the reasons why they are being fired, others will be indifferent as to
the reasons for being fired. And as Judge Posner points out in his
interesting comment on Professor Cornell, still others will find Profes-
sor Cornell's proposal worse than the status quo, under which work-
ers can be fired for no reason. After all, under the current system,
* Professor of Law, Cornell University.
Cornell, Dialogic Reciprocity and the Critique of Employment at Will, 10 Cardozo L.
Rev. 1625 (1989).
2 Professor Cornell's article is based on the extremely dubious premise that employers do
not voluntarily explain to workers why they are being dismissed. She also seems to presume
that employers would not divulge their reasons for firing a worker even if the employee re-
quested that they do so. The reality is that employers generally do provide workers with the
reasons they are being fired. If a problem exists, it is not that employers do not provide work-
ers with reasons for firing them, but that they are likely to stress reasons that are less humiliat-
ing and dehumanizing to workers than the truth. But Professor Cornell should approve of this
practice.
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"when a worker is fired with no reasons given, at least he is not stig-
matized by a determination that he is a bad worker."3 Thus, there is a
wide gulf between Professor Cornell's goal of insuring that employers
do not destroy the sense of well-being and identity enjoyed by work-
ers, and her policy goal of requiring that a worker be given reasons for
being fired. But Judge Posner goes too far in the other direction when
he claims that Cornell's proposal "would make discharges more pain-
ful and humiliating than they need be" 4 because some employees
would prefer to be told the reasons they are being fired, just as Profes-
sor Cornell suggests.
Two other aspects of Judge Posner's response to Professor Cor-
nell deserve special mention at the outset. The first is that Judge Pos-
ner wholly agrees with Professor Cornell's assertion that
individualism is socially constructed and not presocial.5 Thus both
Posner and Cornell share the Hegelian perspective that individuals
lack natural rights to anything, including the right to contract. Like
Professor Cornell, in place of a natural rights orientation, Judge
Posner wbuld substitute the view that these rights are socially
constructed.
Second, and there is a bit of irony in this, both Judge Posner and
Professor Cornell seem to agree that individual well-being is a social
product, although they disagree strongly about the role of the con-
tracting process in defending people's sense of well-being. Judge Pos-
ner does not seem to believe that the contracting process has much of
a role to play in this regard. Professor Cornell, on the other hand
believes that contract has much to do with it, but that workers are
unable to protect themselves from employer malice, so the state
should step in to protect the worker.
The purpose of this Comment is to challenge both Professor Cor-
nell and Judge Posner on both of these counts. In the first section I
will argue that pragmatic justifications and natural rights justifica-
tions are not mutually exclusive, and that Judge Posner's observations
about the state's ability to determine the extent of a person's well-
being does not undermine the natural rights position in the way that
he suggests.
Second, and more importantly, I will argue that there are impor-
tant economic implications to the proposition that people identify
with their work. Professor Cornell is correct to emphasize that work-
ers who feel alienated by a corporate bureaucracy from which they
3 Posner, Hegel and Employment at Will, 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 1625, 1635 (1989).
4 Id.
5 Id. at 1626-27.
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feel isolated and removed are likely to feel less fulfilled in their work
than they otherwise might. But in making this important point, Pro-
fessor Cornell fails to understand that employers as well as employees
would prefer to have workers who are engaged and who feel a sense of
identification with their jobs. This is because these sorts of workers
are likely to be more productive than disaffected workers. Further-
more, the contracting process can be used to encourage workers to
identify with their work and to develop feelings of loyalty.
Identification with one's work and loyalty to one's employer in-
volve an allocation of firm-specific human capital. Workers and em-
ployers can, to a large extent, use the contracting process to determine
the extent to which workers' personalities will be tied up in their
work. The employment contracts given to workers provide important
incentives and other signals that inform workers about how worth-
while it will be for them to allow themselves to identify strongly with
their jobs. In other words, the contracting process plays a major role
in determining the extent to which workers will identify with their
work. An important illustration of this phenomenon is the Japanese
workplace, where a pervasive system of lifetime job tenure has given
workers an incentive to develop a variety of inchoate firm-specific
skills, which come in the form of a strong sense of loyalty to their
employer and a keen sense of identification with their jobs.
Thus, unlike Professor Cornell, I do not believe that it is inevita-
ble that a worker's personality will be tied up in his work. Rather, I
believe that the degree to which a worker identifies with his job can be
influenced by the nature of a worker's employment contract. -And,
unlike Judge Posner, I do not believe that providing workers with the
reasons they are fired inevitably will make discharges more painful
and humiliating.
I believe that employers' can create work environments in which
workers will develop firm-specific skills. On the other hand, of
course, sometimes employers will refrain from creating such environ-
ments, in which case workers are unlikely to identify strongly with
their jobs. In such cases, however, workers will not be subject to the
sort of malicious firing with which Professor Cornell is concerned.
I. NATURAL RIGHTS AND SOCIAL INTERACTIONS
Judge Posner is quick to point out that he sides with Hegel and
with Cornell in his rejection of the concept of natural rights. Posner
writes that:
Like Hegel, I do not believe that individuals have "natural" rights,
whether to make contracts or to do anything else. The natural
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state of human beings is not one of equality but of dependence on
more powerful human beings. Economic freedom in the classical
liberal sense is one of the luxuries enabled by social organization.
The long life, wide liberties, and extensive property of the average
modern American are the creation not of that American alone but
of society ... and of luck.6
In my view, Judge Posner's analysis is flawed in two ways. First is his
assumption that an individual's rights can be natural if they are a
product of social interaction rather than of his skills and efforts
alone.7 The fact that the skills and efforts of a social group combine
to enhance the value of a particular individual's own natural endow-
ment does not diminish the fact that that initial endowment belongs to
the individual who owns them in the most fundamental sense.
Clearly, the value of Michael Jordan's basketball talents would be sig-
nificantly altered if there were no professional basketball league. But
this does not mean that Mr. Jordan's talents are not naturally his.8
Similarly, but even more fundamentally, Judge Posner and Pro-
fessor Cornell confuse the concept of "right" with the concept of
"power." For example, Judge Posner asserts that "the state has a
right to take away the difference between my income and that of the
average resident of Bangladesh." 9 From this he concludes that our
rights are social rather than natural. But, in my view, the state does
not have the right to take away the difference between Judge Posner's
income and that of the average citizen of Bangladesh. It merely has
the power to do so.
If a state exercises its power to deprive its citizens of their natural
rights, it does not eliminate the existence of those rights, it merely
deprives the owners of their use. The term natural rights refers to
those rights which every person possesses by virtue of his status as a
human being. To the extent that the contours of these rights can be
articulated, the state bears a heavy burden of persuasion when it ar-
gues that they should be taken away.
In one sense the distinction I am drawing between the Posner/
Cornell position and my own is significant and in another sense it is
trivial. The distinction is trivial in the sense that once the state has
deprived an individual of her right to something (say, to enter into
mutually consensual contractual arrangements), the issue of whether
she has been deprived of a natural right, or whether the right never
6 Id. at 1626.
7 Id.
8 See also R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia 161-64 (giving other reasons for allowing
basketball players to earn economic rents).
9 Posner, supra note 3, at 1627.
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existed is wholly academic. I would argue that, in such an instance,
the state has used its power to deprive the individual of her ability to
do something, but that she retains her inchoate natural right to do the
thing. Thus, I do not equate the phrase natural right with inalienable
right. By contrast, Posner and Cornell would say that she has lost her
rights when the state passed the law forbidding the act, since she lacks
any natural rights. From a consequentialist perspective, of course,
this distinction is meaningless because the tangible effects on a person
affected by the law are the same in either case: she will be forced to
comply with the dictates of the state.
From another, more abstract perspective, the distinction between
Posner/Cornell and myself is an important one. :They would argue
that because natural law does not exist, it can have no influence on the
contours of civil law. But because I side with Locke and Montesquieu
and against Hegel, Posner, and Cornell, I would argue that natural
law should influence the shape of the civil laws, and that a system of
civil laws is not going to be useful to a society unless it conforms to
the dictates of natural law.' 0 Judge Posner is of course correct in his
observation that the social power of the state is of enormous practical
consequence. The state does have the power (though I would argue
not the right) to deprive one of its citizens of the difference between
his income and that of the average citizen of Bangladesh. But I would
argue that a natural rights orientation would be of value because it
would tend to place the burden of persuasion on the state whenever it
wanted to deprive its citizens of some right or other. By contrast, the
Posner/Cornell approach starts with the assumption that people have
no rights that are intrinsic to themselves. To Posner and Cornell,
rights are allocated on a purely "pragmatic" basis. If somebody can
come up with a good pragmatic argument for why he should get
Michael Jordan's salary instead of Michael Jordan, then he has the
right to that salary. The problem I have with this approach is that it
makes the wealth transfer process too easy. In a world in which poli-
tics is driven by self-interest, individuals who wish to retain their
rights against the pervasive inroads of the state need all the help they
can get."
10 See generally J. Locke, Two Treatises of Government (P. Laslett ed. 1960) (1698)
(describing the relationship between civil and natural law); Montesquieu, The Spirit of the
Laws (T. Nugent trans. 1949) (1748) (same).
11 See Macey, Transactions Costs and the Normative Elements of the Public Choice
Model: An Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 Va. L. Rev. 471 (1988) (arguing that
constitutions should erect structural barriers to the legislative process to protect natural rights
and make wealth transfers more difficult).
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II. THE INTERSECTION BETWEEN CORNELL AND POSNER: THE
UNWAIVABLE RATIONAL CAUSE STATUTE
Judge Posner argues that the common law doctrine of employ-
ment at will is likely to be more efficient than the legal regime Cornell
advocates. His claim is based on two observations. First, Judge Pos-
ner observes that employment arrangements that call for employment
at will are voluntary relationships freely entered into by employers
and employees. 12 Second, Posner notes that this voluntary arrange-
ment, like other volitional contracts, will probably make workers bet-
ter off because "the employee at will is likely to have a higher wage
than he would if he had an employment contract or other job tenure
(including Professor Cornell's proposed 'rational grounds' protec-
tion)."' 3 But suppose it is the case, as Judge Posner himself suggests,
that employers would be willing to give employees job protection if
and only if the employees similarly agreed to refrain from quitting
their jobs.' 4 Further suppose that there are limitations on the con-
tracting process in this country that make it doubtful that such con-
tracts would be enforceable. If this were the case, then the voluntary
employment-at-will agreement that Judge Posner defends may only
be efficient in a world of the second best. For reasons discussed be-
low, it is at least arguable that the first best state of affairs might be
similar to the one that exists in the Netherlands and in Japan, i.e., one
in which neither employees nor employers may terminate the employ-
ment relationship at will.'" In other words, Judge Posner's argumenis
about the desirability of employment at will are cast into doubt by: 1)
the fact that other social orders have abandoned the presumption of
employment at will and appear to be flourishing both in terms of pro-
ductivity and in terms of workers' job satisfaction; and 2) the fact that
the enforceability of a labor contract prohibiting an employee from
ever quitting is doubtful.
I will argue that the simple fact that we observe voluntary
employment-at-will arrangements in this country does not conclu-
sively prove that it is more efficient than an alternative regime. I will
argue that a Japanese-style employment regime in which workers
have job tenure and employers have defacto assurances from workers
that they will not leave for other jobs in fact may be more efficient.
But in this country workers and their employees are not able to make
12 Posner, supra note 3, at 1629.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 1631 (a rule "entitling a person to demand a reason for being fired ... logically
entails a right (of the employer) to demand a reason for quitting").
15 See infra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
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employment contracts containing these provisions because they would
not be enforceable in U.S. courts. Consequently, the dominant Amer-
ican regime of employment at will may be the market's second-best
solution in the face of this legal impediment to the contracting
process.
In my argument I will embrace many of Professor Cornell's ob-
servations about the way that workers view their jobs. I wish to em-
phasize at the outset, however, that in doing so, I do not share her
view about the pernicious nature of the employment relationship. In
addition, I reject her proposal for rational cause statutes, which in my
view, would impede rather than promote the objectives Cornell is
seeking to achieve.
At the heart of Professor Cornell's analysis is the:
Hegelian insight, later developed by Marx, that work is crucial to
the development of personality because it allows us to externalize
our creative capacities in the world. When our ability to exter-
nalize our capacities is challenged, so is our personhood. Of
course, to merely give reasons for the firing cannot completely take
away that harm. What it does is recognize just how important
work is to personality. It demands that a firing be seen as the seri-
ous assault on personality that it is. To impose this harm without
reasons is to belittle the damage done.' 6
So, for Cornell, work is important to one's personality. From
this insight, Cornell moves to the rather odd conclusion that "[w]e all
have the capacity to recognize the need for rational-cause statutes be-
cause we would not want to live in a society where human beings can
lose something as important to their sense of identity and well-being
as a job without some reason."' 7
While I agree with Professor Cornell that one's sense of identity
and well-being are important, her assertion that giving employees the
right to receive notification of the reasons for being discharged is a
necessary precondition for a tolerable society seems outlandish. Is
our society really one in which we would not want to live? Appar-
ently not. Is she implying that her policy prescription actually will
restore a discharged worker's sense of identity and well-being? This
too seems unlikely. And finally, is her policy formulation really con-
sistent with Hegel's idea of reciprocal symmetry. For the reasons I
outline below, this too seems problematic.
More specifically there are at least three things wrong with Pro-
fessor Cornell's proposed policy prescription. First, her formulation
16 Posner, supra note 3, at 1614-15.
17 Cornell, supra note 1, at 1580.
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does not come remotely close to guaranteeing to workers their sense
of identity and well-being. It does not take a particularly astute judge
of human nature to recognize that being told the reasons for one's
discharge may not enable a worker to retain his sense of identity and
well-being. Indeed, Cornell's claim that a party can have a legal obli-
gation to protect another person from loss of identity and well-being,
seems highly suspect. Even more dubious is her assertion that we
would not want to live in a society in which a person's sense of well-
being could be stripped away without reason. The truth is that this
happens all the time. The person whose firm goes bankrupt, the per-
son struck with the undeserved carcinoma or disfigured in an automo-
bile accident, may quickly lose his sense of identity and well-being
without reason. In the scheme of things, the traditional employment-
at-will relation that Cornell is attacking appears to be among the most
sane and rational aspects of human existence.
Second, Cornell substitutes legal obligation for reciprocal sym-
metry in two ways. She begins by eliminating the possibility that
workers will achieve mutually consensual, voluntary agreements by
interjecting state coercion into the contracting process. Next, she
abandons Hegel's idea of reciprocal symmetry by giving a right exclu-
sively to one party, without providing the other party with any corre-
sponding right.
Thus, Cornell's analysis seems at odds with the Hegelian concep-
tion of the contracting process as a mechanism for expressing one's
personhood. This criticism seems particularly damaging to Professor
Cornell's claim to have found support in Hegel, since it seems to re-
place Hegel's symmetry in contractual obligations with feudalism's
asymmetry. For Hegel, the ability to contract freely, like the ability
to own property, conveys value because it permits the property owner
or the contracting party "to be recognized as a formal equal, a legal
subject, capable of embodying her will in external things."' 8 In other
words, when the state enforces a contract between two people, it is
enforcing an "obligation imposed on both parties by right as part of
the legal recognition of their personhood."' 19 Nowhere is this more
clear than in Hegel's master-slave dialectic in the Phenomenology of
Mind,2" where Hegel reasons that people can only obtain recognition
of themselves as individuals from other people. And, as Professor
Cornell herself recognizes, a horizontal mutuality of recognition is
necessary for the achievement of the concrete relations of mutual
18 Id. at 1590.
19 Id. at 1593.
20 G. Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind (J. Baillie trans. 1967) (1807).
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symmetry.2' Cornell's proposed solution, however, would undermine
the contracting parties' purported status as equals because it would
deprive the employee of any real opportunity for recognition in the
Hegelian sense since recognition would be mandated by the state,
rather than proffered voluntarily. This would undermine the very
consequences Hegel ascribes to the contracting process.
Professor Cornell's response to the claim that the legal regime of
rational cause statutes she proposes is inconsistent with Hegel's con-
ception of reciprocal symmetry requires that we "move beyond
Hegel's own understanding of the sphere of private right."' 22 She is
candidly arguing that we have to abandon ("recast" is the term she
uses) the Hegelian conception of reciprocal symmetry in order to "re-
main true to the aspiration of achieving the 'good' of relations of re-
ciprocal symmetry.
23
Professor Cornell suggests that an "abstract ' 24 sort of reciprocal
symmetry of the kind that I describe does not really reflect conditions
of equality, because the employment-at-will doctrine is a vestige of the
asymmetrical legal relationships of feudalism, 25 and that so long as
this sort of inequality exists, the state must intervene to protect condi-
tions of horizontality.26
For me, it is difficult to reconcile this aspect of Professor Cor-
nell's depiction of Hegel with her earlier succinct observation that
"[iun Hegel, the historical development of modern contract principles
and of the legal person who can freely enter into contractual negotia-
tions expresses the realized relations of reciprocal symmetry that dis-
placed the asymmetrical obligations associated with feudalism. '27 If,
as Hegel claims, legal personhood is a social achievement, then Cor-
nell's argument that state intervention is necessary to achieve contrac-
tual symmetry is really an admission that our society has not
progressed much, if any, beyond feudalism because it has not devel-
oped to a stage at which employees can contract on equal terms with
their employers. Put another way, the ability of a person to enter into
a freely negotiated contract is a manifestation of a position of equality
with his trading partner. It is, to use Hegel's terms, a manifestation of
reciprocal symmetry. If as Professor Cornell suggests, state interven-
tion at the micro-level is needed to achieve horizontality because we
21 Cornell, supra note 1, at 1603.
22 Id. at 1581.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 1582.
26 Id. at 1581.
27 Id. at 1578.
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have not yet moved beyond feudalism to modernity, then society's
social problems are in need of a far more effective palliative than a
rational cause statute is likely to bring.
In other words, for Hegel, individuality is a social construct.
One of the social inventions that permits individuals to achieve indi-
viduality is the ability to contract. Professor Cornell argues that in
the realm of employment relationships, individuality can only be
achieved through a form of state intervention that deprives employers
and employees of the ability to contract freely. It is hard to fathom
how such an arrangement contributes to, rather than detracts from
the individuals whom it constrains. In other words, state intervention
into the employment relationship may benefit workers in a way that
Professor Cornell deems desirable, but it will not achieve the condi-
tions of horizontality and mutual recognition that Hegel thought were
necessary conditions for the discovery of individual freedom.
After all, if my contracting partner is forced by the anonymous
arm of the state to recognize my right to something, it is hardly accu-
rate to say that I am bargaining as an equal. Similarly, if I am able to
retain my job solely because of political coercion, then I am unlikely
to obtain the same sense of inner satisfaction and fulfillment as I
would in a job in which I am working because my employer assigns a
high value to the fruits of my labor.
I should also point out that Professor Cornell offers no explana-
tion for why employers do not voluntarily provide workers with rea-
sons for firing them. Professor Cornell's article is premised on the
assumption that employers' decisions to discharge workers are often
motivated by reasons other than lack of productivity such as person-
ality or life-style differences. But the world of employers cannot be so
easily stereotyped, and the motivations behind employment dismissals
are diverse and complicated.
Judge Posner points out that providing employees with the rea-
sons for firing them might only add to their humiliation at being dis-
missed. This is clearly true for at least some employees. And if we
assume that employers somehow can be made to tell the truth when
they are giving their reasons for discharging an undesired employee:
[a]nother objection to the just-cause or rational-cause principle is
that it would make discharges more painful and humiliating than
they need be. When a worker is fired with no reasons given, at
least he is not stigmatized by a determination that he is a bad
worker. Under Cornell's proposal, fewer workers would be fired
... but those that are fired would be branded as bad workers ....
28 Posner, supra note 3, at 1635.
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But I would go a bit further than Judge Posner. Speaking for myself,
if I were to be fired from a job, I would prefer that the reason for my
discharge not be related to my productivity. I would prefer to be fired
for being too ugly or too fat than to be fired for being unproductive.29
This is, I suppose, because I have a great deal of my personal identity
tied up in my work, as well as because I don't much care whether
people think I'm ugly or fat. By contrast, one might argue that a
sexist society has caused women to be more concerned about their
appearance than men, and that women might therefore have different
preferences than men regarding the basis for being fired. Specifically,
I am told that some women might prefer to be told that they are being
fired for being unproductive rather than for being fat or ugly.30 My
point here is that individuals differ tremendously in their personalities
and self-identities. One person might take pride in something that
humiliates another. An unwaivable just-cause statute of the sort she
proposes certainly will make some workers worse off than the status
quo. Such a statute will even diminish the sense of identity and well-
being of some workers. In any event, it seems clear that if employers
behave in the mean-spirited way Professor Cornell suggests, her mod-
est policy prescription is hardly going to achieve the grandiose objec-
tives she envisions. Thus, it would seem that Professor Cornell has
launched something of an inadvertent empirical attack on the legiti-
macy of Hegel's observations that contracting parties can have equal
status. Her vision of the modern employer-employee relationship is
one in which employers are not only exploitive, but needlessly cruel to
workers. If she is correct, then there is very little possibility that em-
ployees will obtain a sense of personhood through their jobs, regard-
less of the degree to which the state intervenes.
Finally, Cornell's goals (increased sense of self and personal ful-
fillment) are far too vague and open-ended to provide support for as
narrow and specific a legal rule as Cornell is advocating: it is hardly
the "objective standard of fairness to which the judge can appeal in
assessing the validity of contractual transactions."31 After all, a judge
could invalidate any contract on the grounds that enforcement would
deprive one party or other of the "sense of well being and identity."
Similarly, of course, there is absolutely no basis for permitting em-
ployers to satisfy their obligations to society simply by providing
workers with just cause. Rather, even the most incompetent or cor-
29 Indeed, I would vastly prefer to be fired for being too skinny than for being
unproductive.
30 1 am indebted to Ms. Robin Flicker of Cardozo Law Review for this point.
31 Cornell, supra note 1, at 1579.
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rupt worker should be allowed to keep her job under Cornell's test if
losing it would involve the loss of the worker's sense of identity and
well-being.32
The point here is not that Professor Cornell is wrong about the
interests of workers in their employment relationship. Rather, the
point is that she is stretching things to claim that her policy prescrip-
tion is grounded in Hegel.33 As I will argue, she would do better to
have grounded her arguments in economics. Like Professor Cornell, I
agree that one's sense of self and one's personhood can be intimately
tied up in one's work. But unlike Professor Cornell, I recognize the
fact that rational employers are likely to value those employees who
identify most strongly with their work, since such employees are
likely to be more productive, as well as more loyal, than other work-
ers. There is a close connection between a worker's loyalty to the firm
for which he works and his sense of identification with that firm. The
greater a worker's sense of loyalty and identification, the more valua-
ble he is likely to be as an employee.
It also stands to reason that the more job security a worker has,
the more likely he is to identify with and develop loyalty to the firm
for which he works. Thus, when a worker ties his personality up in
his work, he is making a firm-specific investment of human capital.
Whether one describes an employee's relationship with his firm as one
of trust and confidence, or, as Cornell does, of "horizontality," the
analysis is the same. Like other firm-specific human capital invest-
ments, all of these attributes must be developed over time. And, like
other firm-specific human capital investments, they increase the
worker's value to her firm, but are of no particular value to other
firms. This is because a sense of loyalty and identification with one's
work are specific to a single firm, and will not be transferred to a new
job if the employee quits or is fired. Like other firm-specific human
capital investments, developing close personal ties with one's work is
likely to increase a worker's value to his own firm, but is going to be
of no value to the employee in another job.
And, like other firm-specific human capital investments, develop-
ing a sense of personal attachment to one's work leaves the employee
who makes this investment subject to exploitation. The employer can
reduce the employee's wages by the amount that the worker obtains in
psychic job satisfaction without fearing that the employee will quit
32 Professor Cornell does not explain why she draws the line at just-cause statutes and does
not go for the whole loaf-lifetime tenure for all employees.
33 See supra notes 16-27 and accompanying text (describing the tension between Cornell's
arguments and the Hegelian ideals of reciprocal symmetry and individualism).
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and seek work elsewhere. But workers, recognizing this potential for
exploitation, will refrain from developing close ties of identification
and personal loyalty if they can be exploited so easily. Employers that
abuse their workers are not likely to have a work force that identifies
particularly strongly with their jobs, or one that is particularly loyal.
Thus, employers who want to engender a strong feeling of loyalty and
identification among their workers are likely to give workers a sense
of job security and invest in developing a reputation for treating work-
ers well.
But loyalty and identification with one's work are attributes that
are not entirely firm-specific. A worker who has displayed loyalty and
a sense of identification for one firm has shown that he has the capac-
ity to develop it for another. Thus, while these attributes are them-
selves entirely firm-specific, the ability to develop them is generic. A
worker who is loyal to one firm is likely to be able to develop a sense
of loyalty for another. For this reason, firms may be unwilling to
grant workers a lengthy employment contract, which will induce
workers to develop a sense of loyalty and identification, unless they
have some assurances that the workers will not exploit the firm by
quitting if a better job offer comes along. Thus, employers and em-
ployees have an incentive to enter into long-term employment ar-
rangements in which it not only is difficult for employers to discharge
employees, but also difficult for employees to quit. Making it difficult
to discharge employees will improve productivity by giving workers
the incentive to develop strong personal ties with their firms. Making
it difficult for employees to quit provides employers with the assur-
ance that employees will not be lured away after they have demon-
strated a proclivity for productivity and loyalty. The dilemma facing
both workers and employers in the fast food industry illustrates this
point nicely. Employers generally complain that the work force is
unstable, and workers in the industry complain because the pay is so
low. It seems clear that employers would offer higher wages if doing
so would produce a more stable work force. Unfortunately, there is
no way that workers can offer a credible (bonded) promise that they
will not quit in order to obtain higher wages because the promise not
to quit would be unenforceable.
I also wish to emphasize how closely attributes such as loyalty,
personal identification to the firm for which one works, and relations
of trust and confidence with co-workers and superiors, are connected
to the Hegelian notion that our personal identities are "profoundly
tied up in our employment."34 The individual who personally identi-
34 Cornell, supra note 1, at 1620.
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fies with and is very loyal to her firm personifies the Hegelian vision of
the employment relation as depicted by Professor Cornell. But Pro-
fessor Cornell assumes that these relationships blossom automatically
whenever someone is hired. This is not the case. Some workers are
highly disaffected, while others identify quite strongly with the firms
for which they work. Some workers find their jobs demeaning and
degrading, while others find it possible to define themselves com-
pletely through their work. These events are not random. Different
jobs come with different expectations of self-fulfillment.
For example, higher wages are likely to give workers a greater
sense of fulfillment and self-worth than low wages. And job tenure of
a stronger variety than the kind Professor Cornell advocates will ac-
complish the same thing. In addition, it seems clear that greater job
security will provide workers with a stronger feeling of loyalty and
with an added incentive to identify with the firm for which they work.
I would like to point out that the analysis presented here casts
doubts on Professor Cornell's assertions that only higher level em-
ployees are not fungible and that technically unskilled workers are
especially subject to exploitation. 5 Professor Cornell seems to. be of
the opinion that employers only value employees that they train.36 In
fact, employers value even untrained employees who identify closely
with their work and exhibit a strong sense of loyalty to their jobs.
These workers are not fungible. Indeed, they may be even less fungi-
ble than the highly skilled and semi-skilled workers that Cornell
presumes have such strong bargaining positions. This is because in
the modern workplace, most skills are easily transferable from one
employer to another. But the attributes of loyalty and identification
with an employer are not. Consequently, a highly committed un-
skilled worker may be far more difficult to replace than a superbly
skilled, albeit fickle, professional worker.
Put another way, Cornell has it backwards when she asserts that
firms only value workers in whom they have made large investments
in training. Firms are only going to make large investments in train-
ing workers whom they think will be loyal enough to remain with the
firm for a sufficient period of time to allow the firm to recoup its in-
vestment. After all, as long as the skills being provided to the workers
are easily transferable, after the investment in training has been made,
it is the worker, and not the firm, who has the opportunity to engage
in exploitation.37
35 Id. at 1616.
36 Id.
37 The existence of schools, including law schools, illustrates this point. Students receive
518 [Vol. 11:505
HeinOnline -- 11 Cardozo L. Rev.  518 1989-1990
1990] FIRM-SPECIFIC HUMAN CAPITAL INVESTMENTS 519
A worker, recognizing the dilemma facing the employer, might
be willing to promise to remain on the job for a certain length of time
in order to induce the employer to provide him with training he
desires. Thus, it might well be in the interests of both employees and
employers for employees to be able to agree to work for a particular
firm for a specified time. In other words, it seems that Professor Cor-
nell was too quick to abandon the idea of strict symmetry in employ-
ment contracting. Just as the parties might want to have the right to
be able to obtain a justification before dismissal, so too might the par-
ties want to be able to bind themselves to remain at work for an
agreed upon period.
Judge Posner ridicules the prospect that such an arrangement
could benefit the parties, theorizing that a worker who signed a con-
tract making it difficult for him to quit "might be forced to spend his
whole life in a job he hated."38 But the fact is that Japan has for years
had an employment system very similar to the one Posner is describ-
ing. Roughly one-third of Japanese workers in non-agricultural sec-
tors has lifetime tenure.39 Workers are virtually guaranteed lifetime
employment by their employers, but employers also have had an im-
plicit agreement among themselves not to hire laterally from other
firms. Japanese workers do not seem to be miserable, as Judge Posner
suggests they will be. Rather, Japanese workers are known for their
high productivity and close sense of identification with the firms for
which they work. Indeed, Japanese workers often describe their firms
as extensions of their families, and even Japanese industrial organiza-
tions are structured to resemble somewhat family and village life.4 °
As Professor Ike of Stanford has observed:
the nature of employment practices utilized by management
promotes group goals. Friendship, camaraderie, a sense of belong-
ing, and the approval of one's peers are powerful inducements for
individuals to put out maximum effort (on behalf of the firm for
which one works). By the same token, the threat of withholding
these can act as a powerful sanction. By contrast if one were sim-
ply a member of a large organization, he would have much less
incentive to work hard for the common good, because no matter
how hard he worked the contribution he made would seem insig-
generic skills that enhance their value in the workplace. Because the skills are obtained before
work begins, employers will subject themselves to exploitation if they incur all of the costs of
providing this specialized training with no assurance that the people they train will not jump
ship. For this reason, students pay the costs of obtaining a legal education and hope to recoup
their investment over their working life.
38 Posner, supra note 3, at 1631.
39 Nobutaka Ike, Japan: The New Superstate 36 (1974).
40 Id. at 40-41.
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nificant in relation to the total output.41
The experience of Japanese workers is consistent with the theory
of firm-specific capital investments presented in this Article. If em-
ployees and employers believe they have entered into a stable employ-
ment arrangement, workers will have strong incentives to develop
close personal ties with their firms. But employers' incentives to pro-
vide such a stable employment arrangement are not without costs,
42
and employers will be unlikely to provide increased job tenure unless
they have some assurance that workers will not leave at the first better
opportunity that comes along.
The above discussion suggests that at least some American work-
ers and their employers might be better off if they had employment
arrangements that more closely resembled those of their Japanese
counterparts. The Japanese system does seem to engender the attri-
butes of loyalty and identification that Cornell describes.
Judge Posner's rejoinder to this analysis is that the employment-
at-will doctrine comes with a strong presumption that it is efficient
because it has survived the competitive pressures of the U.S. labor
markets.43 The problem with this analysis is that it is highly doubtful
that the parties would be able to forge an enforceable contract that
made it difficult for workers to quit-even in return for a promise that
made it difficult for employers to fire them. Restrictions of this kind
are frowned upon under United States law and construed extremely
narrowly. Thus, the dominance of the current regime of employment
at will may simply be a second-best solution in light of the fact that
the alternative is impossible to achieve under current law.
While Cornell errs because she fails to recognize the value to em-
ployees and employers of being able to stipulate that the employee
will remain at work for a particular length of time, Posner errs be-
cause he fails to recognize the extent to which employers can exploit
firm-specific human capital investments in loyalty made by workers.
Judge Posner observes that an employee develops skills that are spe-
cialized to a particular job he is doing for a particular employer.4
These skills are firm-specific in the sense that they are of value to the
41 Id.
42 In particular, it has been noted that Japanese firms do not choose workers on the basis of
ability alone, but are likely to select those workers likely to identify most closely with the firm
and to feel a sense of obligation towards it. Id. at 35.
43 Posner, supra note 3, at 1633 ("[A] free-market institution as persistent and widespread
as employment at will is presumptively more efficient than an alternative imposed by
government.").
44 Id. at 1632.
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firm for which the employee is working but are not of value to other
firms, even other firms within the same industry.
As Judge Posner points out, once the employer recognizes that
an employee has these skills, the employer can act opportunistically
by threatening him "with discharge if he demands a wage equal to his
marginal product for this employer."45 Judge Posner goes on to say
that the employee can threaten the employer with quitting if the em-
ployer does not pay him his full marginal product.46 This too is true.
From these observations Judge Posner concludes that an "employee's
specialized skills protect him from overreaching by the employer at
the same time that they create a temptation for overreaching."47
Where an employer incurs all of the costs of providing an employee
with firm-specific skills, that employer can be exploited by the worker
who has developed the skills. Where an employee incurs the costs of
developing these skills, the employee can be exploited.
The following example illustrates the worker exploitation prob-
lem. Suppose that an employee has certain generic skills that are
worth $15.00 per hour on the labor market. Suppose further that the
worker invests a considerable sum in acquiring firm-specific human
capital skills on the basis of an express or implied promise that he
would be compensated for his investment in the form of a raise to
$25.00 per hour. After making the investment, the employer has an
incentive to refuse to raise the worker's pay above $15.01 per hour
because $15.00 is the most the worker could obtain if he quit and tried
to find employment elsewhere. Posner concludes that workers and
employers can solve this problem by sharing the costs of the develop-
ment of firm-specific human capital.
This conclusion seems to ignore the subtle nature of many, per-
haps most, firm-specific. human capital investments. For example,
Judge Posner seems to ignore the fact that, in order to avoid the possi-
bility of exploitation, workers and employers must not only contem-
plate sharing the costs of a firm-specific human capital investment,
they must be able to coordinate the timing of their respective expendi-
tures perfectly. Reference to the above example illustrates the point.
The worker and the firm both contemplated sharing the costs of the
worker's investment in firm-specific human capital. The worker in-
vested in new information, and the employer paid for it in the form of
higher wages. But the timing of payments left the worker susceptible
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cise moment at which he made his firm-specific human capital invest-
ment could he avoid exploitation by his employer. Once the
investment is made, he is subject to ex-post contractual opportunism
by his employer. Several factors, including the pattern of repeat deal-
ings between the worker and the employer, as well as the desire of the
employer to maintain its reputational capital, will induce employers
to compensate employees for their investments in firm-specific human
capital even after those investments have been made. The fact re-
mains, however, that the potential for exploitation exists.
I wish to stress that the existence of this potential for exploitation
is a burden for both employers and employees. Employers will find it
difficult to induce employees to make firm-specific capital investments
because the employees recognize that they may not be compensated
for them. Employees will be deprived of the compensation that such
investments would bring if it were possible to construct a stable con-
tracting regime.
This point becomes more clear when we recognize the subtle na-
ture of many firm-specific capital investments. Among the more sig-
nificant sorts of fiim-specific capital investments are loyalty to the
firm for which one works, personal identification by an individual
with her firm, relationships of trust and confidence with co-workers
and with one's superiors in the corporate hierarchy. Like other firm-
specific human capital investments, all of these attributes must be de-
veloped over time. And, like other firm-specific human capital invest-
ments, they increase the worker's value to her firm but are of no
particular benefit to other firms.
CONCLUSION
This Comment suggests that the following dynamic may exist in
employment relations of all types. First, employees and employers
can, at least to some extent, control the degree to which their own
sense of personhood is linked to their work. Employees can withdraw
emotionally and psychologically from their jobs if they feel disen-
gaged, or they can identify closely with their work if they become
attached to it. Similarly, by creating an inclusive, nurturing work en-
vironment, employers can encourage workers to identify with their
work.
Second, vague attributes such as "identification with one's work"
and a worker's "sense of loyalty" are firm-specific human capital
skills in the sense that they enhance a worker's value to the firm for
which he works and are specific to the firm to which they apply. As
workers' sense of job security and feelings of belonging increase, so
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too will their sense of loyalty to their firm. With increased loyalty
comes increased productivity. Although these specific attributes such
as loyalty and a sense of identification with one's work are firm-spe-
cific, it stands to reason that workers who have demonstrated these
attributes towards one firm are more likely to develop these skills if
working for another firm. In other words, while the attributes them-
selves are firm-specific, the capacity to develop them is not. Thus,
firms have less of an incentive to provide job security than they would
have if they could be assured that their workers could not easily move
to another firm. This poses a problem for both workers and employ-
ers because both would like to see employees be able to bind them-
selves to a particular firm for an extended length of time.
Thus, I believe Professor Cornell is wrong to abandon the Hege-
lian idea of reciprocal symmetry so quickly. It seems to me that sym-
metry does exist, in the sense that the contracting problems of
workers and employers are identical. Each is subject to exploitation
by the other if one makes a nontransferable investment before being
compensated for it.48 Judge Posner assumes away this problem by
concluding that it will be solved if workers and employers share the
costs of developing human capital skills. But this solution ignores the
fact that the timing of the expenditures is extremely important. In
addition, Judge Posner's analysis doesn't seem to recognize the incho-
ate nature of the firm-specific skills that one develops during the
course of one's employment. In particular, loyalty and a sense of
identification with one's work are a form of firm-specific human capi-
tal investment. Both employers and employees have an incentive to
bond themselves into service for the firms for which they work in or-
der to make it more likely that such investments will be made.
48 The point is developed at length in Macey, Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital Invest-
ments, and the Legal Treatment of Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1989 Duke L.J. 173
(1989).
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